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Howzat! The High Court, Negligence and Indoor Cricket 
 
Introduction 
 
The game of cricket contributed to the law of torts through the House of Lord’s 
decision in Bolton v Stone.1 As the law develops, so does the game and in a 
recent decision, the High Court was called upon to consider its progeny: the 
sport of indoor cricket. Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd2 deals with the 
obligations of an indoor cricket centre to its players and is a good example of 
how the factors relevant to determining the issue of breach of the duty of care 
are balanced.  
 
Unfortunately for sports lawyers, or those with a more general interest in tort 
law, this case does not shed much light on when liability will be found. The 
Court was split in its decision with both majority and minority judgments 
producing compelling reasons. Nevertheless, there are still a few interesting 
observations that can be made about the case. 
 
                                                 
1 [1951] AC 850. Note the judicial criticism of this case. It has been suggested that this 
decision was not firmly grounded in legal principle but was instead informed by ‘policy 
considerations concerning English cricket’. (Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 
at 50 per Murphy J) See also McPherson J in Wilkinson v Joyceman [1985] 1 Qd R 567 at 
590. 
2 (2002) 186 ALR 145, [2002] HCA 9. The citations that follow refer to the ALR reference. 
Facts 
 
Michael Woods, the appellant, was blinded in one eye during a game of 
indoor cricket. He was an experienced cricketer although he had played only 
one game of the indoor variety prior to his accident. The injury occurred when 
the appellant mistimed a pull shot with the result that the ball ricocheted off 
the bat into his eye. This accident happened at a facility owned and operated 
as a business by the respondent, Multi-Sport. The respondent organised the 
games of indoor cricket and also supplied some equipment to players.  
 
The appellant sued alleging a breach of the duty of care in two respects. The 
first was that the respondent was negligent for failing to provide the appellant 
with proper eye protection. The second breach alleged was the failure of the 
respondent to warn the appellant by way of a sign of the dangers of indoor 
cricket, and in particular, of the risk of serious eye injury. The District Court of 
Western Australia found that a duty of care existed but that it had not been 
breached. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
dismissed the appeal. 
 
The High Court’s Decision 
 
The High Court also dismissed the appeal although only by a narrow margin. 
Gleeson CJ wrote the main judgment of the majority with which Hayne J 
generally agreed. Callinan J wrote a separate judgment but reached the same 
conclusion as the Chief Justice. Kirby and McHugh JJ formed a persuasive 
minority and each wrote their own judgment.  
 
There was no dispute that the respondent owed the appellant a duty of care, 
nor was the formulation of the content of that duty in issue. The parties 
accepted, as stated by the trial judge, that the respondent had to ‘take 
reasonable steps to avoid the risk of injury to players arising from the dangers 
involved in playing indoor cricket’.3 The issue before the Court was whether 
the respondent had breached that duty of care. The appellant contended that 
it had in failing to provide eye protection and failing to give a warning. The 
High Court considered these two potential breaches in some detail. 
 
Eye Protection 
 
The majority held that the trial judge was not in error in finding that the 
respondent did not need to provide eye protection. Reasonableness did not 
require that this precaution be taken and the majority referred to a number of 
factors supporting this conclusion. The first was the low risk of a player’s eye 
being injured. All of the majority accepted the trial judge’s assessment that the 
likelihood of injury was comparatively small at only two serious eye injuries 
per year for a total of 12 500 indoor cricket players in Western Australia.  
 
                                                 
3 Ibid at 146 per Gleeson CJ. 
Another consideration was the availability and practicality of eye protection 
appropriate for indoor cricket. The arguments centred on helmets as the most 
suitable sort of protection because it was accepted that eye goggles, such as 
those used in squash, provided insufficient protection against an indoor 
cricket ball. The first point made by the majority was the absence of helmets 
specifically designed for indoor cricket. Conventional cricket helmets were 
suggested as an alternative although it was found that they were 
inappropriate for the indoor game.  
 
To support this finding Gleeson CJ, and to a lesser extent Callinan J, 
considered in some depth the evidence given as to the nature of indoor 
cricket. The physical nature of the game was of particular importance. Indoor 
cricket is played in confined spaces with players moving very quickly in close 
proximity to each other. The prevalence of diving and sliding was noted and 
there was also evidence of what was described as ‘clashing’ between fielders 
and batters.4 Gleeson CJ called it a ‘body contact sport’.5  
 
The majority considered the high level of physical contact between fast 
moving players to be significant. Conventional cricket helmets have both 
visors and face guards that protrude some distance beyond the player’s face. 
The visor, which provides shade for the player, can be removed but the face 
guard has to remain. It was suggested that the wearing of such helmets with 
protruding face guards in a contact sport like indoor cricket might actually 
                                                 
4 Ibid at 147 per Gleeson CJ. 
5 Id. 
create other dangers for players in collisions. The majority noted that the 
evidence showed that fielders were at as much risk of eye injury as batters so 
all players would be wearing helmets. This many players all wearing helmets 
and moving at speed in a confined area would further increase the danger of 
injury. 
 
A third and final factor that the majority considered was the customary 
standards of the sport of indoor cricket. The rules of the Australian Indoor 
Cricket Federation ‘actually discourage’6 the use of helmets as a player 
needed to seek permission to wear one. There was evidence before the trial 
judge that this rule was grounded in the concerns already discussed about the 
inappropriateness of helmets for indoor cricket. There was also evidence that 
the wearing and supply of helmets was not part of the standard practice of 
other indoor cricket players and organisers. The trial judge gave weight to this 
evidence and the majority was of the view that she did not err in doing so. She 
made it clear that she did not consider herself bound by it by saying: ‘It is not 
a question of “just because everyone else is doing it that makes it right”.’7 The 
majority accepted that the trial judge used this evidence only to help 
determine what was reasonable. 
 
The majority concluded that it was reasonable for the respondent not to 
provide eye protection for the appellant. The risk of eye injury was small, there 
were no helmets that were appropriate for indoor cricket and the rules and 
                                                 
6 (2002) 186 ALR 145 at 149-150 per Gleeson CJ. 
7 Ibid at 180 per Callinan J. 
practice of the game actually discouraged the wearing of such equipment. On 
this evidence, the trial judge did not err in reaching the conclusion that she 
did. 
 
The minority of Kirby and McHugh JJ disagreed. One of their main concerns 
was the undue weight given by the trial judge to the customary standards of 
indoor cricket. Kirby J felt that she erred because she ‘surrendered the 
standard of care required by the law to the rules made by the Federation.’8 
Both judges asserted that the reach of the common law extends to the 
sporting field and that it is for the courts to decide when negligence has 
occurred. Their view of the case was that the respondent had been negligent 
in failing to provide eye protection for the appellant and identified the factors 
that underpinned this conclusion. 
 
The first of these factors was that the risk of injuries to the eye was not small. 
Both judges cited evidence before the trial judge that showed that eye injury 
had become a sufficiently common occurrence to have raised awareness in 
the medical profession of this particular danger. A couple of doctors who gave 
evidence had become so concerned that they had been actively promoting 
better eye safety for the sport of indoor cricket. 
 
A second factor was the gravity of the potential harm. Total blindness in one 
eye is a significant injury. Kirby J said: ‘Conducting business at the cost of an 
average of two players blinded in one eye each year in the State of Western 
                                                 
8 Ibid at 172. 
Australia, and doing nothing, does not, in my view, amount to reasonable 
conduct.’9 This was contrasted with evidence about other sports such as 
lacrosse and ice hockey where eye protection had virtually eliminated these 
sorts of injuries. 
 
The minority also thought that an appropriate helmet (a conventional cricket 
helmet with the visor removed) was available for use in indoor cricket. Both 
judges found evidence that suggested this piece of equipment would not 
cause injury to other players. Again, a comparison was made with other 
sports where a protruding face guard had not caused problems. Such a 
precaution was not unreasonable because the trial judge made a specific 
finding that providing or hiring helmets of this kind was commercially viable.  
 
The minority concluded that there was an appropriate, affordable precaution 
that would eliminate or significantly reduce the risk of eye injury. When 
balanced against the seriousness of losing the sight in an eye and the 
probability of such an injury occurring, it was not reasonable for the 
respondent to fail to act. This was particularly so in light of the fact that the 
injury occurred while the respondent was pursuing its business for profit. Both 
judges found that the trial judge had erred and that the respondent had 
breached its duty of care. 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid at 173. 
Warning 
 
The second alleged breach of the duty of care was the respondent’s failure to 
warn the appellant of the risk of injury, and in particular, the risk of eye injury. 
The evidence suggested that a sign saying ‘Players play at own risk’ was 
often displayed at the facility. However, the trial judge was not satisfied that 
the sign was on display on the two occasions that the appellant played indoor 
cricket. 
 
Again, the majority held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the 
respondent had not breached its duty of care in failing to warn the appellant of 
this risk. The trial judge referred to ‘inherent risks’, that is, those risks that 
were ‘by their nature obvious to persons participating in the sport.’10 She 
contrasted these risks with those that contained an ‘unusual or hidden danger’ 
that would raise the need for a warning.11 The trial judge categorised the risk 
of being hit in the eye by a ball during a game of indoor cricket as one that 
was obvious to players. As a result, she found that no warning was required. 
 
All three judges in the majority thought it relevant that the sport of indoor 
cricket posed risks of many different types of injuries.12 It was not reasonable 
to require that all of these risks be identified and brought to the attention of 
                                                 
10 Ibid at 151 per Gleeson CJ. 
11 Id. 
12 (2002) 186 ALR 145 at 151, 153 per Gleeson CJ, at 178 per Hayne J and at 182 per 
Callinan J. 
potential players. In relation to the increased chance of sustaining an eye 
injury in indoor cricket as opposed to the outdoor game, a warning of this 
increased risk was not required. Warning signs are ‘not intended to address 
matters of precision.’13 
 
The minority disagreed and thought that the judge erred in not requiring a 
warning to be given. It was not self evident nor obvious that indoor cricket 
posed a particular risk of increased eye injury when compared with the 
outdoor version of the game. Reasonable care required that potential players 
be warned of this increased risk. The minority would have ordered a new trial 
on this point to determine whether the warning would have prevented the 
injury. In reaching his decision, Kirby J specifically stepped away from the 
‘obviousness’ of a risk as the sole criterion for determining when a warning is 
required. Although this is still very relevant to the whether a duty to warn 
arises, the issue must be decided by reference to all of the circumstances of 
the case.14 
 
Comment 
 
The High Court in Woods decided that the respondent indoor cricket centre 
had acted reasonably in not providing helmets or a warning about the risk of 
eye injury. However, it is premature for sporting organisations and 
associations (and their insurers) to breathe a sigh of relief. This decision 
                                                 
13 Ibid at 153 per Gleeson CJ. 
14 Ibid at 174-175. 
provides only limited guidance as to when liability in sporting contexts will be 
found.  
 
The main reason for this is that Woods involved an unusual fact situation in 
that the rules of the Australian Indoor Cricket Federation discouraged the use 
of helmets. This circumstance had an impact on the majority’s decision and it 
is at least arguable that one of the judges may have reached a different view 
without this factor. This decision may not be useful as a general indicator of 
when negligence will be found because it is unlikely that other sports would 
actively discourage the use of safety equipment in the same way. In fact, it 
can be argued that in relation to indoor cricket, contrary to the result in 
Woods, this case might actually increase the likelihood of liability. The trial 
judge suggested that it might be time for the Australian Indoor Cricket 
Federation to develop an appropriate helmet that can be used safely as part 
of the game.15 Having been put on notice, a failure by the Federation to act on 
this suggestion may be considered negligent. 
 
A second reason why Woods provides limited guidance is that the Court was 
divided in its decision. Although the majority concluded that the duty of care 
had not been breached, the minority produced very compelling judgments, 
particularly in relation to the issue of eye protection. A different composition of 
the Court may have resulted in a finding of liability. One reason why the Court 
was divided in its decision was because the issue of breach of the duty of 
care is a question of fact. As Gleeson CJ specifically noted, it was a question 
                                                 
15 Ibid at 150 per Gleeson CJ. 
on which judges might reach different conclusions.16 In fact, both Gleeson CJ 
and Kirby J were careful to emphasise that the assessment of breach in this 
case was a question of fact.17 
 
Questions of fact are decided on the evidence and another reason why it is 
difficult to discern direction from this case is that the majority and the minority 
treated the evidence very differently. On a number of the issues, the judges 
seemed to reach different conclusions because they relied on the evidence of 
different witnesses. For example, the majority relied on medical evidence to 
conclude how uncommon eye injuries in indoor cricket were and compared 
them with the total number of players participating in the sport. In contrast, the 
minority stressed the awareness that existed amongst the medical profession 
as to the high incidence of eye injuries. Another example was the Court’s 
consideration of the appropriateness of conventional cricket helmets for the 
indoor game. 
 
An important consideration for the High Court was the way in which the 
relationship between the appellant and the respondent was characterised. 
Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, characterised the relationship as one that 
involved the voluntary use of a recreational centre by an adult. Callinan J, in 
particular, emphasised this relationship saying it would be rare that a warning 
                                                 
16 Ibid at 153. 
17 Ibid at 154 per Gleeson CJ and at 174-175 per Kirby J. 
about the likelihood of injury would be required in a sporting context.18 On the 
other hand, Kirby and McHugh JJ strongly emphasised the business aspect of 
the relationship. They mentioned on a number of occasions that those who 
profit from an activity have particular safety obligations. 
 
What does Woods mean for the law of negligence on the sporting field? The 
first thing it does is highlight something most practitioners already know: it can 
be very hard to advise in this area. Woods provides an excellent illustration of 
how difficult it can be to predict whether a duty of care has been breached. A 
second point is that sporting bodies should not rely on this case when making 
decisions about how they want to operate their activity or game. The 
members of the Court were divided and the case was decided on a very 
particular set of facts. It is worth noting by those advising sporting bodies, that 
Callinan J continued to indicate his very clear view that promoters and 
organisers of sport would only rarely, if ever, be required to warn of the 
possibility of being injured while participating in a game. 
 
A third matter is that practitioners must be conscious of how the relationship 
between the parties will be characterised by a court. Business and profit-
making relationships are more likely to attract liability than relationships 
characterised as voluntary recreations engaged in by an adult. A final point to 
note, at the risk of stating the obvious, is that the question of whether the duty 
                                                 
18 Ibid at 182 per Callinan J. See also Agar & Ors v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 600-601 per 
Callinan J for further discussion of the relationship between a sporting body and the 
participants in that sport. 
of care has been breached is always going to be a question of fact. Woods 
may not be a watershed in the development of the law of torts like Bolton v 
Stone19 and its consideration of cricket. However, it is an interesting case and 
provides a good illustration of how difficult it can be to determine when a 
sporting body will in breach of a duty of care owed to its participants.  
                                                 
19 [1951] AC 850. 
